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Abstract
This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent
of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988-
1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we
ﬁnd that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced,
more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a
reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears
to be substantial: In our baseline speciﬁcation, an increase in concentration by 20%
leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.
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11 Introduction
Active trade policies are seldom justiﬁable on eﬃciency grounds. In most cases, they are
instead the result of distortions introduced through the political process. While a large liter-
ature has highlighted the role of organized groups in the provision of trade protection, only
few theoretical contributions have explicitly identiﬁed the link between industrial structure,
the process of lobby formation and the determination of trade policy. In this paper we use
Magee’s (2002) model to understand the recent Brazilian trade liberalization experience.
The case of Brazil is very interesting for a variety of reasons. First, although widely
discussed in the press, the role of lobbying by organized groups in shaping economic policy in
the large Latin American country has been the subject of only sparse studies (Olarreaga and
Soloaga (1998), Helfand (2000), Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2003)). Secondly, the
generalized trade liberalization that took place between 1988–1994 has been a major policy
reversal, and represents a particularly challenging ground to test explanations of trade policy
based on the lobbying activity of organized interests groups. Third, the existing empirical
literature linking lobbying activity and industrial structure based on cross-sectional studies
(Baldwin (1985), Treﬂer (1993), Goldberg and Maggi (1999) etc.) has not reached clear–cut
conclusions on the role of industry structure in explaining protection. As Rodrik (1995)
points out
“High levels of concentration in the aﬀected industry itself are apparently not
always conducive to protection: some studies ﬁnd a negative relationship be-
tween seller concentration and protection (...), while many others ﬁnd a positive
relationship (...)”(page 1481).
In this paper we use instead a panel data set, and explicitly allowing for time lags we show
that more concentrated industries have been able to obtain policy advantages even during
the “abertura comercial” (trade liberalization) pursued by the Collor administration. Not
only industry structure matters, but its impact appears to be substantial. In our baseline
1speciﬁcation, an increase in concentration by 20 percentage points leads to an increase in
protection by 5 to 7 percentage points.
Between 1988 and 1994, the Brazilian government implemented a generalized reduction
of the tariﬀ level, accompanied by the elimination of most non–tariﬀ barriers. The extent of
the policy reversal has been dramatic: In 1994 nominal tariﬀs in the manufacturing sector
were, on average, one quarter of their 1988 levels, and one tenth of their 1985 levels. As a
result, Brazilian manufactured imports (FOB, in current dollars) were in 1995 three times as
large as in 1988. In certain industries, like “natural and synthetic” fabrics, imports increased
more than ten times. The speed and the far reaching extent of the reform have represented
a substantial shock to the domestic manufacturing sector, whose eﬀects on growth and
technology adoption have been documented, among others, by Ferreira and Rossi (2003),
Muendler (2002) and Hay (2001).
While the reduction in the rate of protection took place across the board and was ac-
companied by a decline in the dispersion of tariﬀs, not all sectors were aﬀected to the same
extent. In particular, casual observation leads to conjecture that protection from interna-
tional competition fell less for highly concentrated sectors, represented by a strong lobby (e.g.
the motor vehicle industry), while it fell much more in competitive industries (e.g. textiles),
which were not as able to voice their concerns to the federal government. Such anecdotal
evidence is well explained by the recent literature linking endogenous lobby formation to
industrial structure, and the purpose of this paper is to understand to what extent this pat-
tern emerges systematically, when we consider the entire manufacturing sector. We perform
our empirical analysis using a panel data set for Brazilian industries. The data encompass
annual observations for the years 1988–1994 for a cross section of up to 42 industries. In most
of our regressions we use two alternative measures of trade protection, i.e. nominal tariﬀs
2and the eﬀective rate of protection1, while concentration is measured by the CR4 index.2
We show that industry structure matters, and the impact of concentration is substantial.
In our baseline speciﬁcation an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in
protection by 5%-7%, and the conclusion appears to be robust. We interpret these results
as hinting that while an ideological change has occurred in Brazil, that has made import
substitution an unacceptable strategy of development, the process through which the spe-
ciﬁc, cross sectional, pattern of protection is determined has not changed as a result of the
liberalization eﬀort. In particular, our estimates point out not only that more concentrated
sectors have been able to organize themselves and eﬀectively lobby politicians, but also that
elected oﬃcials have continued to be highly responsive to the eﬀorts of pressure groups.3
The role of lobbying by organized interest groups has long been recognized as an impor-
tant determinant of commercial policy, but most of the literature explaining trade policy as
the result of inﬂuence driven contributions (Grossman and Helpman (1994)) has taken as
exogenously given the existence of pressure groups. In two interesting papers, Mitra (1999)
and Magee (2002) have instead considered the endogenous formation of both lobbies and
trade policies. While in Mitra (1999) a lobby is assumed to come about if the rents gener-
ated more than cover the ﬁxed cost of forming a lobby, the paper by Magee (2002) explicitly
takes into account the role of the industrial structure on the ability of ﬁrms to cooperate
in the lobbying eﬀort.4 The latter seems to ﬁt very well the known stylized facts on the
recent Brazilian experience and for this reason, we adapt this model to motivate our empir-
ical investigation. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the theoretical motivation, while section 3 reviews the recent Brazilian trade liberalization
1We don’t have data on quantitative restrictions, but this is not a serious limitation since almost all
quantitative barriers had been eliminated before the beginning of our sample. See Geraldino da Silva (1999)
for details.
2The share of the four largest companies in the total revenues of the sector.
3We will explicitly refer to the “weakness” of the Brazilian government later in the paper.
4Earlier attempts in a similar direction are Rodrik (1986) and Pecorino (1998), but here protection was
simply modelled as an increasing function of the contributions received, and the bargaining between the
government and the pressure group was not explicitly analyzed.
3episode and relates it to the structure of Brazilian manufacturing. We present then the
data set used to carry out the analysis and discuss the result of the estimation in section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
To formalize the link between endogenous trade policy and industrial concentration and
take into account some speciﬁc features of the Brazilian experience we adapt the model
developed by Magee (2002). As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) trade policy is the result
of the interaction between an organized group and an elected oﬃcial, but while Grossman
and Helpman (1994) take the existence of a pressure group as given, this model endogenizes
its formation making it a function of industry characteristics, and in particular of industrial
concentration.
Following Pecorino (1998) and Magee (2002) the setup of the model is kept as simple
as possible in order to better understand the problem at hand. A small open economy
produces two goods, a numer` aire X0 and an import competing good X1. The numer` aire is
manufactured using only labor, the supply of which is ﬁxed and equal to L, while the import
competing good X1 produced by a set N of identical ﬁrms using a common, sector speciﬁc
capital whose supply is normalized to 1. For both goods, the production function exhibits
constant returns to scale and units are chosen so that one unit of the input is converted in
one unit of output. The numer` aire is freely traded in international markets, and its price is
normalized to one. Given the production technology, this implies that the labor wage rate
is also equal to one. The import competing good is traded on the international market at a
price equal to pw, and the domestic price will therefore be p = pw + t, where t is an import
tariﬀ. Consumers-workers share the same quasi-linear preferences, u = x0 ¡ 1
2(a ¡ x1)2, so
that the demand for the import competing good is given by D(p) = a ¡ p. As in Rodrik
4(1986) we make the simplifying assumption that capitalists do not consume the X0 output.5
The endogenous formation of a lobby and the corresponding trade policy are the result of
a two stage game between ﬁrms in the sector and the government. In the ﬁrst stage, the
identical ﬁrms play a repeated game and decide whether or not to cooperate and contribute
to the lobbying eﬀort. In the second stage, the group of ﬁrms negotiate with an elected
oﬃcial a payment C(t), in exchange for the implementation of a tariﬀ t. The game is solved
backwards, i.e., once the result of the negotiation is known, each ﬁrm decides whether to
cooperate and contribute to the lobbying eﬀort, or to be opportunistic. The punishment in
case of deviation from the cooperative equilibrium is represented by perpetual reversal to
the non cooperative outcome. Once the decision to cooperate or not has been reached, total
contributions are collected and the actual trade policy is implemented.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), in choosing the optimal policy, the government
trades oﬀ contributions against aggregate welfare (W(t)). To model the diﬀerence between






C(t) + aW(t) if C(t) > C
aW(t) if C(t) · C




D(p)dp] + L + n¼(t) + t(D(pw + t) ¡ 1) (1)
The ﬁrst term is consumer surplus, the second represents labor income, the third aggregate
proﬁts and the last tariﬀ revenues. The government’s objective function tells us that an
elected politician is inﬂuenced by the lobby’s eﬀorts only if the contributions paid are above
a minimum threshold C. If contributions are too low, the government will discard the eﬀorts
5This is equivalent to assume that only a measure zero subset of the population actually owns capital, as
in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
5of the organized group and implement the socially optimal policy, which for a small open
economy is represented by free trade. The threshold C describes the “strength” of the
government, i.e. his ability to withstand the eﬀorts of organized groups to inﬂuence policy
determination. A strong government will be willing to compromise only if contributions are
substantial.
The industry group maximizes instead aggregate proﬁts net of contributions, or
Π(t) ¡ C(t) =
X
i2N
(¼i(t) ¡ ci(t)) = n(¼(t) ¡ c(t)) (2)
where given our assumptions the expression for the speciﬁc factor’s income takes the very
simple form ¼(t) = 1
n(pw+t). In the ﬁrst stage the agents play a Nash bargaining game, and





(Π(t) ¡ Π(0)) +
a
2
(W(0) ¡ W(t)) (3)
where Π(0) is the free trade proﬁt level, while W(0) is the free trade level of aggregate welfare6
This implies that the lobby and the government equally share the surplus generated by the
introduction of the distortion.7 It is easy to show that contributions are monotonically
increasing in the tariﬀ rate and strictly convex. The function can therefore be inverted,
obtaining a tariﬀ schedule that is increasing in contributions and concave.
In the second stage of the game, each individual ﬁrm chooses to cooperate if and only if
the present value of the net proﬁt ﬂow associated to cooperation ( 1
1¡±(¼c¡cc)) is higher than
the net proﬁts arising from a one period deviation (¼d ¡ cd) followed by an inﬁnite reversal
to the non-cooperative outcome ( ±
1¡±(¼n¡cn)). More formally, cooperation will be sustained
6This is the same contribution schedule as in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
7We consider this distribution of the bargaining weight as a focal case, but the analysis can be carried out
in a more general setup were the government’s share in the surplus deriving from the political relationship
varies. Magee (2002) points out that an increase in the number of lobbies in this model is equivalent to an
increase in the share of the surplus obtained by the government.
6if and only if
(¼d ¡ cd) +
±
1 ¡ ±
(¼n ¡ cn) ·
1
1 ¡ ±
(¼c ¡ cc) (4)




(¼d ¡ cd) ¡ (¼c ¡ cc)
(¼d ¡ cd) ¡ (¼n ¡ cn)
(5)
Assuming that ¼d ¡cd ¸ ¼c ¡cc ¸ ¼n ¡cn, ±¤ < 1. Notice that ±¤ measures the diﬃculty of
enforcing cooperation and therefore an increase in its value can be interpreted as a worsening
of the free rider problem. The main contribution of Magee (2002) is to characterize the
relationship between the severity of the free rider problem and the number of ﬁrms active in
a sector. In particular, he is able to show that
Proposition 1 Under Nash bargaining, ±¤ is monotonically increasing with the number of
identical ﬁrms active in the industry.
In other words, the free-rider problem will become worse if the number of ﬁrms active in the
industry increase.
To gain some intuition for this result, let us ﬁrst focus on the non cooperative outcome.
In a non cooperative equilibrium, ﬁrms maximize their own proﬁts, without considering the
eﬀect of their own lobbying on the other ﬁrms. The marginal beneﬁt of a dollar spent on



























where q is the ﬁrm’s output. Evaluating the slope of the contribution schedule at t = 0, we have that
@C
@t = 1
2nq, from which the result follows.
9Notice that in a more general model this result, i.e. that in the non-cooperative equilibrium each ﬁrm
7This implies that in the noncooperative equilibrium each ﬁrm’s transfer to the politician
will be nil. Given the preferences of the politician, his desired policy in the absence of
contributions is free trade, and free trade will be chosen if cooperation cannot be enforced.
Remembering that ¼c = 1
n(pw +tc), ¼d = 1
n(pw +td) and ¼n = 1




td ¡ (tc ¡ Cc)
td
(7)
Consider now the case in which one ﬁrm deviates from the cooperative outcome and decides
to free ride. Assuming that the other ﬁrms continue to play the cooperative strategy, the
total contributions paid to the government will now be Cd =
(n¡1)
n Cc. As the number of ﬁrms
increases, Cd monotonically approaches Cc, and correspondingly the tariﬀ td approaches tc
from below. This is the source of the diﬃculty in enforcing cooperation when the number
of ﬁrms increases in this model. The point can be made clearer by examining the eﬀect
of an increase in the number of ﬁrms on the minimum discount factor needed to sustain
cooperation, ±¤. It is easy to show that the sign of d±¤
dn is the same as the sign of
@td
@n(tc¡Cc) >
0. In other words, since the tariﬀ under defection is growing closer to the cooperative level
as the number of ﬁrms increases, the incentive to free ride becomes larger the larger is the
number of ﬁrms active in the industry. Notice that key to this result is that the increase in
the number of ﬁrms does not aﬀect the non-cooperative outcome. Given that the lobby and
the government equally share the surplus from the lobbying activity, as long as the industry
is not a monopoly, in the non-cooperative equilibrium ﬁrms will contribute nothing and this
outcome will not be aﬀected by an increase in the number of ﬁrms active in the industry.
Such an increase will instead increase the one period gains from a unilateral deviation, and
it is in this sense that lobbying becomes more diﬃcult.
While this result is by itself interesting, discount factors are in general not directly ob-
servable. In order to bring the model to the data a more useful approach is to assume that
will not contribute anything to the government continues to hold also in the presence of heterogenous ﬁrms,
as long as the bargaining power of the elected politician is large enough, or, in other words, if there are
enough active lobbies.
8full cooperation cannot be enforced – in other words that ± < ±¤ – and study the eﬀect of an
increase in n on the maximum sustainable tariﬀ. To do so, rewrite equation (4) as follows:
(1 ¡ ±)(¼d ¡ cd) + ±(¼n ¡ cn) · (¼c ¡ cc) (8)
Let Z(±;t) = n[(1 ¡ ±)(¼d ¡ cd) + ±(¼n ¡ cn)] represent the temptation to deviate from the
cooperative outcome, while V = n(¼c¡cc) represents the gains from cooperation. Using our
functional form assumptions, we can show that









2 ¡ 1] (9)
and







Notice that Z(±;t) is strictly increasing in t, since the non-cooperative outcome is not
going to be aﬀected by the cooperative tariﬀ, while V (t) is concave and initially increasing in
t. Furthermore, V does not depend upon the number n of ﬁrms active in the sector. Z(±;T)
and V (t) are represented in ﬁgure 1. As we can notice, the two curves intersect at the
non-cooperative tariﬀ level tn = 0. Full cooperation can be enforced when ± = ±¤, and the
corresponding maximum sustainable tariﬀ (tc) is deﬁned as the solution of Z(±¤;tc) = V (tc).
For a sustainable tariﬀ level tm 2 [tn;tc] to exist, @Z
@t (t = 0) < @V
@t (t = 0). Let ± be the
minimum value of ± such that this condition is satisﬁed.
Remember that the one period net return from defecting (¼d¡cd) is larger than the non-
cooperative return (¼n¡cn). It is then easy to show that @Z
@± < 0. For ± < ± < ±¤ there exists
then a maximum sustainable tariﬀ tm, i.e. a tariﬀ value such that Z(±;tm) = V (tm). From
equation (9) we also know that (@Z
@n > 0), i.e. the temptation to deviate is increasing with
the number of ﬁrms n active in the industry, while V does not depend upon n. An increase
in the number of ﬁrms in the industry will therefore move Z(±;t) upwards, reducing the
96
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Figure 1: Maximum sustainable tariﬀ
maximum sustainable tariﬀ for a give discount factor ±. We have then proved the following
Proposition 2 Under Nash bargaining, the maximum sustainable tariﬀ tm is monotonically
decreasing with the number of identical ﬁrms active in the industry.
This model illustrates how the collective action problem ﬁrst studied by Olson (1965)
might arise when we consider the formation of a lobby interacting with an elected politician to
provide tariﬀ protection to an industry. This simple framework in which all ﬁrms are identical
and the lobby shares with the government the surplus from their political relationship gives
us an empirically assessable prediction: The observed tariﬀ should be decreasing with the
concentration of an industry. If, as in the case of Brazil, a paradigm shift has occurred in
which an import substitution regime has been repudiated in favor of a liberalized regime,
tough politicians could well not be sensitive to the inﬂuence eﬀorts of organized groups, and
completely liberalize trade. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to the evaluations of
these predictions.
103 Trade and industrial concentration in Brazil
Until the late eighties the Brazilian government has pursued an aggressive import substitu-
tion industrialization strategy, that has involved the use of high tariﬀ rates, exchange rate
controls and interventions, and often prohibitive non–tariﬀ measures.10 The New Industrial
Policy introduced in 1988 by the Sarney administration represents a strategy reversal, and
the beginning of a process of progressive trade liberalization. While the approach was rather
timid at ﬁrst, and involved only the elimination of redundant tariﬀs, after 1990 the pace of
reform accelerated, and the newly sworn in Collor administration actively embraced trade
liberalization as a long term development strategy. The reforms introduced involved both
the complete removal of quantitative restrictions, and the introduction of a time table for
tariﬀ reductions, which was implemented in four steps in February 1991, January 1992, Oc-
tober 1992 and July 1993. The ﬁrst two steps emphasized reduction in tariﬀs on capital and
intermediate goods, while the reduction in the protection granted to ﬁnal (consumer) goods
occurred later. As a result of the reform, by 1997 nominal tariﬀs were on average one-tenth
as large as in 1987.
To explore systematically the possible link between industrial concentration and trade
protection, we use a panel data set which has been constructed with data from two diﬀerent
sources. Measures of trade protection, i.e. nominal tariﬀs and eﬀective rates of protection
were obtained from Kume (1996) and cover 56 sectors over the period 1988 to 1994. Data on
industrial concentration, measured using the share of a sector’s total sales appropriated by
the four largest ﬁrms (CR4) cover instead the period between 1986 and 1995 and include 51
sub–sectors. The same dataset includes annual series on capital-output ratio (KY ), on total
machine and equipment purchased as a proportion of revenues (MP); investment-output
ratio (INV ), on the total labor force employed in production (LF) and also a proﬁtability
measure (J11). These series were constructed from the “Pesquisa Industrial Anual” (Annual
10For a brief description of the main policy instruments used in this period, see Hay (2001).
11The variable J is deﬁned as the cost of products and services bought by the sector divided by its net
11Table 1: Tariﬀs, ERP and Concentration(1988-1994).
Year NT ERP CR4
median max min median max min median max min
1988 0.41 0.90 0.15 0.35 1.83 -0.02 0.32 0.97 0.09
1989 0.34 0.85 0.10 0.37 2.20 0.01 0.31 0.97 0.09
1990 0.30 0.80 0.06 0.29 3.13 -0.07 0.31 0.98 0.08
1991 0.21 0.70 0.06 0.23 2.25 -0.03 0.32 0.98 0.08
1992 0.18 0.49 0.04 0.24 1.66 -0.02 0.33 0.98 0.08
1993 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.21 1.30 -0.03 0.32 0.98 0.09
1994 0.10 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.95 0.00 0.31 0.98 0.09
Industry Survey, FIBGE) and some were obtained from Geraldino da Silva(1999).
Out of the 56 sectors covered by the trade protection database, 10 cross–sections had to
be removed. Eight observations involve agriculture and mining and have been eliminated
because the focus of our analysis is manufacturing. Gasoline and oil production are public
monopolies in Brazil, and for this reason they have also been excluded. This left us with 46
manufacturing sectors for which data on protection were available, to be matched with the 51
subsectors obtained from the PIA. Apart from the diﬀerence in the number of cross-section
and time series observations, the two data sets diﬀer in the aggregation level, and at times
even in the deﬁnition of sectors.12 As a result, we carry out our benchmark analysis with 21
cross–sectional observations, which is the number of exact matches among industries in the
two data sets. These industries represent 46% of the total value added in manufacturing.
To evaluate the robustness of our analysis, we use also an extended data set. To do so, we
have included industries where the matching of sectors is slightly less precise, and extending
the dataset in this way, we have been able to use a total of 41 cross–sectional observations
for each of the seven years in our sample. In 1994 these industries were responsible for more
than 80% of the value added in the manufacturing sector.
Descriptive statistics on measures of trade protection and concentration are reported in
revenue. KY is the ratio between ﬁxed assets and net revenue.
12See the appendix for more details on the construction of the data set.
12Table 1. The median nominal tariﬀ in the 41 manufacturing sectors in the extended data set
decreased from 41% in 1988 to 10% in 199413, while the median eﬀective rate of protection
dropped from 35% to 20%. At the same time, the median (and the mean) CR4 did not change
dramatically, even if there wee changes in several sectors. In particular, in some industries
like “Processed Rice” or “Machines and Equipment” concentration almost doubled, while in
others like “Sugar” the CR4 index declined to two thirds of its original 1986 value.
While the reduction of protection is a general phenomenon, the regime switch did not
aﬀect all sectors to the the same extent. Consider for instance “automobiles, trucks and
buses” and “artiﬁcial textile ﬁbers”. Between 1988 and 1990, the average tariﬀ among the
41 sub-sectors for which we have good data fell by a quarter, while in the automobiles, trucks
and buses sub-sector it actually increased by 21 percent. As a result, the nominal tariﬀ in
this sub-sector went from about one and a half times the mean tariﬀ in 1988 to 2.4 times in
1993 and 1.7 times in 1994. On the other hand, the average tariﬀ levied on artiﬁcial textile
ﬁbers imports went from 1.4 the mean tariﬀ in 1988 to less than 90% of the 1994 mean14.
Clearly, there are forces speciﬁc to the automobiles, trucks and buses industry partially
oﬀsetting the general trend towards a reduction of protection in the Brazilian economy. At
the same time, those forces seem to be weaker in the textile industry.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of nominal tariﬀs and concentration in these two sectors,
normalized with respect to the median of manufacturing. Note that while concentration
in the automobiles, trucks and buses industry throughout the period is at least twice the
manufacturing median, the “artiﬁcial textile ﬁbers” sector shows a below the median con-
centration level (ﬂuctuating around 0.75). At the same time, while the average nominal
tariﬀs in both sectors were almost the same as in 1988 at about 1.5 times the median, in
1994 the average protection was twice the median in automobiles, trucks and buses and
13The corresponding ﬁgures for the entire (56 sub-sectors) sample are 35.6 percent in 1988 and 10.07
percent in 1994.
14The behavior of the eﬀective rate of protection is similar: between 1988 and 1991 it fell, on average, 35%
but it increased by 23% in the auto industry. As for the textile industry, the change was in the opposite
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Figure 2: Protection and concentration
exactly the median in the textile industry.15 The poultry, the dairy and the vegetable oils
(bulk) industries, are other interesting examples of sectors in which concentration was above
(below) average in 1988, and trade protection did not fall as much as (fell more than) in the
remaining industries.
This evidence suggests that the model’s mechanism linking the maximum sustainable
tariﬀ and industrial concentration might well have been at work in the case of Brazil, and
in the next section we formally test this hypothesis.
15Anecdotal evidence on the large political clout enjoyed by Anfavea, the oﬃcial association of the au-
tomobiles, trucks and buses industry is abundant. This lobby has been able to obtain a large number of
policy advantages for its members, ranging from a particularly favorable timetable for tariﬀ reduction, to
tax breaks and subsidies that sectors with less political muscle were not able to achieve. For instance, after
the Asian crisis, the average nominal tariﬀ in the sector jumped to 55% from 20%, while the average tariﬀ
of the manufacturing sector went from 11% to only 14%.
144 Model estimation
Our objective is to test the relationship derived in Section 2 between industry concentration
and trade protection. The theoretical discussion suggests that ceteris paribus, the higher the
concentration of a given industry, the higher the import tariﬀs applied on foreign imports.
Although the model we have discussed is strictly speaking static in nature, we can take
advantage of the panel structure of our dataset to analyze its performance in the trade
liberalization episode we are considering. In order to beneﬁt from the time structure of our
dataset we initially used (one or two years) lagged CR4. Given that in the model causation
goes from concentration to tariﬀ, we found it natural to use a predetermined concentration
index. Moreover, although the channel from industry structure to protection in the model is
same–period contributions, one can think that in practice there is a considerable time period
between the political decision of making a contribution and the ﬁnal eﬀect of obtaining a
given level of tariﬀ.
We used the following equation in all estimations:
Tit = ¯i + Á:Zit + ²it; i = 1;:::;21; t = 1988;:::;1994
where Tit is one of the two openness indicators for sector i at time t, Zit is a vector of
explanatory variables that always contains the concentration index and may or may not
contain additional control variables, ¯i is the industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and " is a zero
mean error term.
Our main data set consists of a panel of 21 industries for seven years (from 1988 to
1994). In all our regression we have used industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Introducing industry ﬁxed
eﬀects we can account for time invariant industry characteristics that are likely to have an
eﬀect on concentration, like for instance large ﬁxed setup costs, and that might otherwise
confound the interpretation of our results, making them for instance compatible with an
infant industry argument.
15Table 2: NT regressions (ﬁxed-eﬀect method, lag concentration)
Model Independent Variable

























Note: t-statistic in parentheses; 21 cross-section observations
To statistically validate our choice, we also ran the Hausmann speciﬁcation test to de-
cide between the ﬁxed-eﬀects and the random-eﬀects method. With nominal tariﬀs as the
dependent variable, the result favored the ﬁxed-eﬀects method, which we therefore used in
all regressions. When the eﬀective rate of protection was instead used, the results were
ambiguous depending on the control variables included in the regression and the time pe-
riod of the sample. We estimated our models using ﬁxed eﬀects also in this case. Table
2 presents the results for our ﬁrst set of regressions. To avoid the potential endogeneity
problems which could arise using simultaneous concentration indicators16 we consider ﬁrst
the results for nominal tariﬀs, NT and lagged concentration (all variables are in logs, except
for the trend).17
The results above support the hypothesis that industry concentration impacts nominal
tariﬀs, as the estimated coeﬃcient of CR4 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 5% in
all regressions. Moreover, the estimated impact is large: for a given capital-output ratio, a
16We will discuss these later on in the paper.
17We could not think of a solid theoretical argument that would justify the possible endogeneity of lagged
concentration, as it appears unlikely that commercial policy today could aﬀect industry concentration two
years ago. Even if this were the case, the regressions run using the weighted two-stage least squares method
obtained results very similar to those of OLS regressions.
16diﬀerence of 20% in CR4 between industries implies 5% to 7% higher tariﬀs.
The inclusion of a time trend is meant to capture macroeconomic and policy changes
that aﬀected the economy as a whole in the period. As already mentioned, there was a
generalized reduction in trade barriers for the manufacturing sector starting in 1988. In
our sample, the median tariﬀ felt from 41.5% to 10.6%. But this decrease was not uniform
across industries, as tariﬀs of some sectors were in 1994 still two times above the median
tariﬀ. The presence of the time trend in the regression simply excludes the common element
of this phenomenon. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient had the expected sign and was highly
signiﬁcant in all regressions. The estimated result says that there was a 20% negative trend
in the nominal tariﬀ value in the period18.
The results are robust to the inclusion of new controls. We tested diﬀerent speciﬁcations
which included (various combinations of) capital intensity measures (KY ), ﬁxed capital
formation (INV and MP), and proﬁtability (J). The estimated coeﬃcient of CR4 did not
change considerably and remained always signiﬁcant. In table 2 we report the coeﬃcients
for the capital output ratio, since this control has often been used in the literature. As in
Treﬂer (1993) the estimated impact is negative, and this might indicate that KY acts as
an entry barrier for both domestic and foreign competitors, so that it reduces the need for
protection and hence the observed tariﬀ levels.19
Table 3 presents the outcome of the regressions in which we use our alternative measure
of protection (ERP). The results are similar to those for nominal tariﬀs, although the
18Note that 20% annual reductions of the 1988 mean tariﬀ (45.9%) for seven consecutive years almost
matched the 1994 observed average tariﬀ. The latter is 10.5% and the former 9.5%.
19Treﬂer (1993), among others, included a measure of geographic concentration in his study as an addi-
tional control. Unfortunately this is not possible in our case, as there are no data available at the same
disaggregation level used in the paper. The ﬁgures are not collected by the IBGE because the manufacturing
sector in Brazil is highly concentrated in the state of S˜ ao Paulo and in the Southern Region, so that in many
states and for many industries the sample would not be representative. Around 50% of total manufacturing
output of the country is produced in S˜ ao Paulo and 75% in the Southern Region, and a similar pattern
emerges also at sectoral level (e.g., using the available broader aggregation, consisting of 22 industries, one
can verify that in only 4 of them S˜ ao Paulo has less than 40% of total output). In this sense, even if there
were data available, the extent of cross–sectoral variation would not be large enough to allow for a signiﬁcant
eﬀect in the regressions.
17Table 3: ERP regressions (ﬁxed-eﬀect method, lag concentration)
Model Independent Variable

























Note: t-statistic in parentheses; 21 cross-section observations
estimated coeﬃcients of CR4 are in most cases larger. The estimated trend remained around
0.20 and KY is signiﬁcant and negative in all models. As for nominal tariﬀs, we tested the
robustness of the model including diﬀerent combinations of INV;MP;J in several regressions
and the estimated coeﬃcient of CR4, trend and KY did not change considerably and always
remained signiﬁcant. The results in Table 3 are similar to the one obtained for nominal tariﬀs:
After controlling for a common trend, in those industries where concentration is higher, trade
protection is larger. According to our estimates, a 10% diﬀerence in concentration implies
a 2% to 5% diﬀerence in the eﬀective rate of protection. A possible interpretation of these
results is that a given industry structure might well have an impact not only on the extent
of protection directly granted to its output, but also, through the value chain, to the extent
of protection granted to the intermediates required in the production process20.
We now turn to regressions with contemporary CR4. One important question to be
addressed in this context is that of the potential endogeneity of our measure of concentration.
One could well argue that the causation goes in a direction that is opposite to what we have
hypothesized in our model: Higher tariﬀs could produce less competition and consequently
20Thus generalizing the stylized facts we discussed for the case of the automobile industry



























Note: t-statistic in parentheses; J was the instrument
in the two last equations. Variables are in logs.
higher concentration. If this were the case, our estimates would be biased and inconsistent.
To test this hypothesis, we ran a version of the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993) and used as an instrument the variable J, which is reasonable to assume as
being correlated with CR4 but not with NT and ERP 21. Again, the results are ambiguous.
For NT the test could not reject the hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates but for ERP,
depending on the time period, the test marginally rejected this hypothesis. To compare the
results, we will present in this case the OLS and (weighted) two-stage least square estimates
in Table 4.
Concentration has the same eﬀect on trade policy as in Table 2, provided that we control
for capital intensity (KY ): the estimated coeﬃcient of concentration is once again signiﬁ-
cant and positive, and the trend is found to be around 0.20 and barriers to entry (KY ) also
appear to be signiﬁcant. For this reason we cannot reject the hypothesis of current con-
centration aﬀecting current trade policy. However, unlike in the case of past concentration,
21The test consists of two OLS regressions. In the ﬁrst, CR4 is regressed on all exogenous variables (here
KY and a time trend) and the instrument and the residuals are retrieved. Then in the second regression, we
re-estimate the NT or ERP equation including the residuals from the ﬁrst regression as additional regressors.
We then check if the coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst stage residuals are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. If this is
the case, then the OLS estimates are consistent.
19Table 5: Extended data set (ﬁxed-eﬀect method)
Dependent Independent Variable









































Note: t-statistic in parentheses; 41 cross-section observations
CR4 becomes insigniﬁcant if KY is removed from the model, and the same result holds
also when we introduce additional controls. One possible interpretation is that a model in
which concentration aﬀects trade policy without delay does not ﬁnd strong supported in the
data, as it has been found already in many other studies (Baldwin (1985), Goldberg and
Maggi (1999)). Results for the eﬀective rate of protection are similar. Exploiting the time
dimension of our panel we are instead able to highlight how past concentration plays an
important role in determining current protection.
As a further robustness check, we have also estimated the speciﬁcation discussed above
using the extended data set, which includes 41 industries. The main results are presented
in Table 5. The estimated elasticity of the NT or ERP with respect to our concentration
measures (CR4(¡1) and CR4(¡2)) as in the original data set, is always positive and signiﬁ-
cant. Moreover, the point estimates for CR4(¡2) are in general considerably higher than in
Tables 2 and 3, and the present estimations imply that that a sector twice as concentrated as















Note: t-statistic in parentheses;
21 cross-section observations
another would have nominal tariﬀs 40% to 30% higher than the latter. The estimated trend,
as in all previous cases, is also around minus 20% a year in all regressions and entry barriers
seems to play a signiﬁcant role. Once again, the link between industry concentration and
trade protection appears to be robust.
The relationship between industry structure and trade protection can also be tested by
regressing CR4 on tariﬀs normalized by the median (or mean) tariﬀ of a given year. Using
this alternative strategy, we correct directly for the generalized reduction of nominal and
eﬀective tariﬀs, without assuming a constant trend year to year. This is done in Table 6,
where MTN is the nominal tariﬀ divided by the median of the corresponding year and
MERP is ERP divided by the median.
We used the (weighted) ﬁxed-eﬀect method in all regressions. The results above are
evidence that the higher the seller concentration in a given industry, the greater the distance
of its tariﬀs to the median tariﬀ (with elasticities between one third and 50%). Moreover,
the use of a constant trend did not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients of the concentration
variables, as they remain signiﬁcant and very similar in size to those of Tables 2 and 3. The
21Table 7: Extended data set (ﬁxed-eﬀect method)
Dependent Independent Variable

























































Note: t-statistic in parentheses; 41 cross-section observations
results are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls available in our dataset.22
To further evaluate the robustness of our results, we run a last group of regressions
controlling for industry size. It is common in the literature (e.g., Caves (1976)) to argue
that protection should be positively related to the number of employees of a given industry,
as this might result in more votes being delivered to politicians deciding on trade measures.
In Table 5 we present regressions with the extended database in which we use “total labor
force employed in production” (LF), to capture the role of industry size. Also when we
account for the role of industry size, our estimates suggest that past concentration continues
to play an important role in predicting protection. Controlling for employment does not
alter the main results and the magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients are close to those in
Table 5.
22To allow for an even more general time structure, we also estimated our models using time dummies.
The results did not change signiﬁcantly.
225 Conclusions
The recent Brazilian trade liberalization episode is a natural experiment to evaluate the
importance of industry structure as a determinant of tariﬀ protection. In the past, a large
body of literature has focused overwhelmingly on the United States to examine the problem
in a cross sectional setup, and has failed to identify a robust relationship between tariﬀ
protection and industrial concentration. In this paper we have instead taken advantage of
the major policy shift implemented in Brazil in the early nineties to re-evaluate the problem
using a panel data set covering the manufacturing sector. The inclusion of a time dimension
in the data has allowed us to avoid some of the obvious endogeneity problems, and we have
shown that industrial concentration is an important determinant of protection. Our results
are robust to the various alternative speciﬁcations we have considered, and we hope that this
might inspire additional work on trade policy and industrial structure, in which the time
dimension is appropriately taken into account.
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